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REVIVING THE FEDERAL POWER ACT'S
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT: A
HISTORY OF NEGLECT AND PROSPECTS FOR
THE FUTURE
By
D. H.

COLE*

In 1920, Congress enacted the Federal Power Act (FPA) to secure
inexpensive and widely available power through federal licensing
of private hydroelectric development in accordance with a "comprehensive plan." The Federal Power Commission (FPC) was
charged with administering the statute and undertook its planning obligations with diligence, preparing plans for at least two
river basins. However, chronic manpower and resource deficiencies
soon led the FPC to neglect Congress' planning directive. No comprehensive plans have been produced since 1930, either by the
FPC or its successor, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC). This failure to plan, combined with the avalanche of
hydro-license applications caused by recently enacted federal
subsidies, has exposed serious flaws in FERC's licensing process,
flaws which result in haphazarddevelopment and inefficient dedication of basin-wide resources, including anadromous fish. This
Article examines the flaws in federal hydropower licensing resulting from FERC's refusal to plan for development, explicates the
benefits of comprehensive planning, and traces the history of federal hydropower legislation. This history proves that Congress intended the FPC and FERC to prepare "real" plans before permitting or licensing projects. Finally, the Article examines current
efforts in Congress and the courts to reinforce the FPA's planning
mandate. The author concludes that comprehensive plans offer
the best hope for rationaldecision making about the future of the
nation's river resources.
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INTRODUCTION

The first half-decade of the 1980's saw "hydromania"' sweep
the country. Particularly in the Pacific Northwest, New England,
California, and Appalachia, entrepreneurs responded to the lure
of federal subsidies and expedited procedures by damming and
diverting flowing streams in the name of renewable resources development and decentralized electric power. In the Northwest
alone, more than 300 applications for hydroelectric projects were
pending in 1985.2 This flood of applications overwhelmed the
1. This "hydromania" is illustrated infra section II. B.2.
2. FERC, HYDROELECTRIC AND OTHER ELECTRIC ALL PENDING WORKLOAD (Jan.
21, 1986). The figure represents pending hydroelectric applications of projects pro-

1986]

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the federal
agency charged with licensing hydroprojects, exacerbating existing flaws in the current regulatory system.
Since 1920, the federal government has regulated hydroelectric development under Title I of the Federal Power Act (FPA).'
Largely unamended for fifty years, the FPA no longer provides an
adequate vehicle for deciding whether rivers should produce electric power, fish, recreation, or some combination of these. This
Article describes the shortcomings of the present system, examines the evolution of the existing regulatory framework, and provides recommendations designed to make the FPA responsive to
the realities of the 1980's, while fulfilling the intent of the Act's
framers.
This Article contends that comprehensive plans offer the best
hope for rational decision making about the future of the nation's
river resources. Planning would promote orderly development and
efficient resource use by (1) increasing FERC's information base;
(2) broadening the Commission's focus, to take into account the
basin-wide resources its decisions affect; and (3) expediting decision-making procedures. If produced by an open, pluralistic process, comprehensive waterway plans would overcome most of the
deficiencies of the existing regulatory system.
Section II of this Article describes the flaws in the current
regulatory system, resulting primarily from a failure to plan. Section III assesses the benefits of planning for orderly development
and efficient resource use, benefits well understood by the progressive conservationists of the early twentieth century, who promoted congressional reform of waterpower legislation. As a result
of their efforts, Congress included a planning provision in the
1920 Federal Water Power Act.4 Section IV reviews the legislative
posed for the states of Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho.
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1982).
4. Section 10 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803, in pertinent part
provides:
All licenses issued under this subchapter shall be on the following
conditions:
(a) That the project adopted including the maps, plans, and specifications,
shall be such as in the judgment of the Commission will be best adapted to
a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of water-power development, and for other bene-
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and early administrative histories of that statute which indicate
that Congress intended FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission (FPC),5 to prepare comprehensive waterway plans
prior to permitting and licensing hydroprojects in order to promote orderly development and efficient resource management.
Unfortunately, by 1930, the FPC began to neglect Congress' planning directive, arguing that its FPA obligations merely required
the Commission to license projects in the "public interest," a position FERC maintains today.' The history of the FPA belies that
contention, and has implications for prospective judicial resurrection of the Act's planning requirement.
The FPC's misinterpretation of section 10(a) became entrenched through decades of judicial and congressional acquiescence." However, as section V discloses, Congress is now considering several legislative proposals to reactivate the planning
provision." In addition, the issue is currently before the Ninth
Circuit United States Court of Appeals.' This Article concludes
that whether judicially or congressionally mandated, comprehensive plans represent the best means of promoting the original conservationists' goals of orderly and efficient river basin development. But, to be effective, planning must be directed to achieve
those goals.

ficial public uses, including recreationalpurposes . . . (emphasis added).
5. Congress created the FPC in the Federal Water Power Act of 1920, 16
U.S.C. §§ 791-823. The Department of Energy Act of 1977 replaced the FPC with
FERC, an independent regulatory agency attached to the newly created Department of Energy. Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 301(b), 401-407, 91 Stat. 565, 578, 582-587
(1977). In addition to the FPC's jurisdiction, the Act gave FERC the powers of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, to establish rates for pipeline transportation of
oil and natural gas. Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(b), 91 Stat. 584 (1977).
6. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
7. Congress has only recently shown renewed interest in the FPA's planning
requirement. See infra note 130 and accompanying text. The judiciary's acquiescence is most likely a function of the more stringent standing requirements existing prior to the 1970's and other historical factors. See infra note 143. The
planning issue is now before the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. See infra
section V.A.
8. See infra notes 158-170.
9. See infra section V.A.
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II.

THE FEDERAL HYDROELECTRIC REGULATORY SYSTEM

A.
1.

The FPA's Adjudicatory System

FERC's Licensing Process

FERC regulates hydropower development by adjudication.'0
After receiving a properly prepared and submitted permit or license application," FERC publishes notice in the Federal Register and in a newspaper located near the proposed project site,"
and forwards notice to interested federal and state agencies."3 If
the proposed project would generate more than five megawatts of
electricity, the applicant must furnish copies of its application to
those agencies.' 4 The Commission must then consider the agencies' comments in its "competitive analysis" of the proposal,
5
before issuing an order.'
Members of the public may intervene in FERC proceedings
10. "Adjudication" generally is a proceeding leading to an order settling individual rights, e.g., to a license. See, e.g., D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, FUNDAMENTALS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 68 (1981). This is precisely the process FERC employs in licensing hydropower projects. See infra notes 11-17 and
accompanying text.
11. A "properly submitted" application is a proposal which complies with the
Commission's filing requirements. On these requirements, see 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.32.33 (1985). FERC processes three types of hydroproject applications: licenses, permits, and exemptions. Licenses are issued to allow dam construction, operation,
and maintenance over a limited license term. 16 U.S.C. § 707(e) (1982). Preliminary permits are issued to secure a priority right in the licensing process while the
project applicant collects data and performs studies. 16 U.S.C. § 707(f); see also
Washington Pub. Power Supply System v. Federal Power Comm'n, 358 F.2d 840,
rev'd on other grounds, 387 U.S. 428 (1966). On exemptions, see infra notes 33,
37-38 and accompanying text.
12. See 16 U.S.C. § 797(f); 18 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1985); Roos-Collins, Intervention
in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Review of Hydropower 11 (1983)
(unpublished article obtainable from the Friends of the River Foundation, Bldg.
C., Fort Mason Center, San Francisco, CA 94123).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 797(f); 18 C.F.R. § 4.60 (1985). See also FERC Answers to
Questions of the House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce [hereinafter cited as FERC Answers] at 20-21
(transmitted in a letter from FERC Chairman Raymond J. O'Connor to the Honorable Richard L. Ottinger, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power, Committee on Energy and Commerce (Feb. 17, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as O'Connor Letter]).
14. 18 C.F.R. § 4.41(f) (1985).
15. See FERC Answers, supra note 13, at 21.
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or comment on permit and license applications.16 Intervenors receive full party status, including the right to judicial review of
Commission orders. 17 However, intervenors must be prepared to
travel to Washington for full evidentiary hearings, and must have
access to sufficient resources to afford judicial review of an adverse agency order.
By enacting a predominantly adjudicatory system for regulating hydropower development, Congress provided FERC and its
predecessor, the FPC, with an effective means of deciding between competing applications. However, adjudication only provides the agency with that amount of information required to settle individual rights.18 In recognition of that deficiency, Congress,
in section 10(a) of the FPA, sought to supplement the Commission's information base by directing FERC to license only those
projects "best adapted to a comprehensive plan.' 9 Unfortunately, FERC refuses to prepare and adopt development plans,
claiming that its licensing process is sufficient to determine which
projects are in the public interest. In effect, FERC argues, the
adjudicatory record becomes the comprehensive plan.20
2.

Flaws in the system

FERC's refusal to plan for development results in ad hoc licensing decisions, haphazard development, and inefficient dedication of river basin resources, primarily by limiting the information available to the Commission. Because it refuses to plan for
development, FERC must rely solely on information provided by
project applicants and the other interested parties who can afford
the expense of participating in evidentiary hearings and possible
subsequent litigation. Thus, the universe of information sources is
limited. Members of the public not represented by the various
"interested parties" have no meaningful voice in Commission pro16. See id. at 25; see generally Roos-Collins, supra note 12.
17. FERC Answers, supra note 13, at 27.
18. See, e.g., D. ROTHSCHILD & C. KOCH, supra note 10, at 68 ("Because adjudication involves individual rights or duties, the procedures must reflect a concern
for those rights.").
19. See supra note 4.
20. FERC Answers, supra note 13, at 39 (" ...
the record should provide
pertinent information on all beneficial public uses and thus contain the information that would constitute elements of a comprehensive plan").
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ceedings; FERC is not required to solicit or respond to their comments. More significantly, the Commission refuses to adopt
hydro-development plans prepared by state and other federal entities, such as the Northwest Power Planning Council, 2' further
limiting the information it considers in its licensing decisions. Ultimately, FERC's voluntary restriction of available information
promotes haphazard development and inefficient resource use.22
In addition, FERC's refusal to plan for development shifts
the administrative focus from the efficient basin-wide dedication
of resources, which Congress sought to ensure in the FPA's planning provision.23 Instead, FERC focuses on individual project proposals, with little regard for the basin-wide consequences of its
licensing decisions.24 Thus, FERC's narrow focus further promotes haphazard development and inefficient dedication of
resources.
Finally, FERC's refusal to plan for development hinders expeditious development by depriving the Commission of a pattern
against which to judge specific project proposals. 5 As a result, the
21. Congress created the Northwest Power Planning Council in the 1980 Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act (Northwest Power
Act), 16 U.S.C. § 839b. That statute directs FERC to consider the Council's plan
"at each relevant stage of decision-making processes to the fullest extent practicable." 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(11)(A)(ii). FERC has resisted this directive, arguing that
the program is advisory only. FERC Answers, supra note 13, at 40. As a result,
implementation of the Council's plan has been "virtually non-existent." Statement of Keith L. Colbo, Chairman, Northwest Power Planning Council, to the
Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, at 4 (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Colbo Statement].
22. For over 50 years, critics have cited the failure to plan as the root cause of
haphazard hydroelectric development. See J. KERWIN, FEDERAL WATER-POWER
LEGISLATION,

at 205-06 (1926).

23. See supra note 4. On Congress' intent, see infra section V.
24. FERC's reluctance to consider the basin-wide impacts of its licensing decisions is illustrated by the controversy surrounding the Commission's limited effort at cumulative impacts analyses. On that controversy, see Eckberg, Cumulative Impacts of Hydropower Development Under the National Environmental
Policy Act: The Requirement of a Basin-Wide Approach [1979-Present Transfer
Binder], 31 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 1 (July 1985).
25. FERC's lack of pattern against which to judge development decisions is
especially troublesome considering FERC's considerable caseload. FERC and its
predecessor, the FPC, have long been overloaded with administrative responsibilities for hydroproject applications and natural gas ratemaking, generating backlogs
of cases since the 1950's. See Gifford, The New Deal Regulatory Model: A History
of Criticisms and Refinements, 68 MINN. L. REV. 299, 317 (1983). In 1958, Profes-
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Commission operates at a snail's pace. Congress, in the late
1970's, exacerbated this problem, as well as the other flaws resulting from FERC's failure to plan, by enacting legislation designed
to increase American energy independence, but which resulted in
the 1980's version of the gold rush-the rush to develop smallhydropower. FERC was inundated with an unmanageable number
of permit, license, and exemption applications, resulting in even
more haphazard development and inefficient dedication of basinwide resources.
B.
1.

PURPA and the Rise of "Hydromania"

Congress encourages hydropower development, 1978-1980

In 1973-1974, the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries
(OPEC) quadrupled the price of world oil,2" shocking an American economy which depended on OPEC to supply one-third of
the total United States energy consumption.2 7 While Congress
sought for a way to stem the flood of imported oil, domestic supplies dwindled and American dependence on foreign suppliers increased. 2 By 1977, the United States consumed 9.6 million barrels of foreign oil each day, accounting for fifty percent of total
sors James March and Herbert Simon concluded that the resulting administrative
"mismanagement" was directly related to a failure to plan. J. MARCH & H. SIMON,
ORGANIZATIONS 137-42 (1958); see also Gifford, supra, at 318. The hydropower
boom of the 1980's has further inundated FERC, increasing its hydropower application workload more than twenty-fold between 1979 and 1981. See infra section
II.B.2.
26. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ENERGY POLICY AND PLANNING, THE
NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN ix (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE NATIONAL ENERGY
PLAN].

27. Grainey, Recent FederalEnergy Legislation: Toward a National Energy
Policy at Last? 12 ENVTL. L. 29, 30 (1981).
28. Congress enacted several pieces of emergency energy legislation between
1973 and 1976, including the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15
U.S.C. §§ 751-760(h); Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§
761-789; Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 791-798; Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422;
Energy Conservaton and Production Act, 42 U.S.C. §§6801-6892; and the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1975, 15 U.S.C. § 753. None of these statutes
achieved Congress' goal of energy independence. On the increased American dependence on foreign oil suppliers between 1973 and 1976, see CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONGRESS, PRESIDENT CARTER'S ENERGY PROPOSALS: A PERSPECTIVE 3 (1977).
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consumption.2 Meanwhile, oil prices continued to rise, causing
the American trade deficit to skyrocket.3 0
It was this three-tiered problem of increasing dependence on
unsecure foreign supplies, rising prices, and decreasing reserves
that President Carter confronted when he took office in 1976.
Within three months of his inauguration, the new President sent
to Congress five coordinated and comprehensive statutes, collectively entitled the National Energy Act, to promote energy independence and conservation. 1 One of these statutes, the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), empowered FERC to
encourage the development of renewable resources, including hydropower. 32 PURPA provided for (1) the exemption of certain
qualifying cogeneration and small power production facilities
from FERC licensing procedures under the FPA,83 (2) loan programs to fund development at existing dams not currently being
used to generate electric power," and (3) guaranteed purchase of
power from qualifying cogeneration and small power production
facilities at "just and reasonable" rates.35
29. THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 26, at 2.

30. See Grainey, supra note 27, at 30-31.
31. The five statutes comprising the National Energy Act were enacted in
1978, little more than a year after they were introduced by President Carter. They
are the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at various sections of titles 15, 16, 30, 42, and 43 of the
U.S.C.); Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174 (codified at
various sections of title 26 of the U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (codified at various sections of titles 12, 15,
and 42 of the U.S.C.); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 8301-8484; and the Natural Resources Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§
3301-3432.
32. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified at various sections of
titles 15, 16, 30, 42 and 43 of the U.S.C.).
33. PURPA, § 210(e), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e).
34. PURPA, § 401, 16 U.S.C. § 2701. The statute authorized loans for up to
90% of the costs of feasibility studies, and up to 75% of the costs of project construction. PURPA, §§ 402-403, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2702-2703. Although Congress has
funded some feasibility studies under PURPA, no money has been appropriated
for funding construction loans. Cook, FederalGovernment Incentives Available to
Spur Commercial Development and Production of Renewable Energy Supplies,
ENERGY L. MEMO 7G, at 40 (Oct. 1981).
35. PURPA, § 210(b)(1), 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b)(1). FERC implemented this
directive by promulgating a rule requiring utilities to purchase the electricity produced by qualifying facilities at their "avoided cost." 18 C.F.R. 292.304(b)(2)
(1985). A utility's "avoided cost" is the price the utility would have to pay to
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The 1980 Energy Security Act (ESA)3s expanded PURPA's
exemption program by (1) doubling the ceiling on power produced from qualifying projects at existing dams to thirty megawatts,3 7 and (2) including projects generating up to five megawatts using "natural water features . . . without the need for any
dam or impoundment. 38 The 1980 Crude Oil Windfall Profits
Tax Act 39 further promoted renewable resources development
through its system of business tax credits. The Act provided an
additional eleven percent credit, on top of the existing ten percent investment tax credit, to qualifying hydroelectric generating
facilities."'
2. The Legacy: "Hydromania" and FERC
The spate of incentives and tax credits offered by Congress in
PURPA, the ESA, and the Crude Oil Windfall Profits Tax Act
had a dramatic impact, as would-be hydropower developers
flooded FERC with permit, license, and exemption applications.
In 1977, the year before Congress enacted PURPA, FERC received just nine permit and thirty license applications for small
hydropower projects."' In 1979-after PURPA, but before the
generate the power itself or purchase the power from another generator. The Supreme Court upheld FERC's rule in American Paper Inst., Inc. v. American Elec.
Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402 (1983).
36. Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94 Stat. 611 (1980) (codified at various sections of
titles 7, 12, 30, 42, and 50 of the U.S.C.).
37. PURPA, § 408(a), 16 U.S.C. § 2708(a)(1), amending 16 U.S.C. § 2708(1)
(1976).
38. PURPA, §§ 408(b), (c)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 2708(b)(2), amending 16 U.S.C. §
2705, 2708 (1976). FERC later promulgated a rule which extended "natural water
feature" exemptions to all projects with "diversion structures" up to ten feet high,
impounding less than two acre-feet of water, and not increasing natural hydraulic
head by more than five percent. 47 Fed. Reg. 38,506, 38,512-13 (1982). The Ninth
Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals invalidated that rule in Tulalip Tribes of Wash. v.
FERC, 732 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1984), because it violated the plain language of
PURPA by making some new dams eligible for exemptions. Id. at 1455. On Tulalip, see Blumm, A Trilogy of Tribes vs. FERC: Reforming Federal Hydropower
Licensing, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1986).

39. I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 1985).
40. I.R.C. § 46 (West Supp. 1985); see also Grainey, supra note 27, at 62. This
additional tax credit expired on December 31, 1985, except for projects already on
FERC's docket as of January 1, 1986. I.R.C. § 46(a)(2)(C)(iv) (West Supp. 1985).
41. See O'Connor Letter, supra note 13, at 3. FERC "licenses" authorize project construction and operation. FERC permits reserve priority for applicants in
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ESA-FERC received 101 combined license and preliminary permit applications. 42 The following year FERC received over 500
applications for preliminary permits alone, indicating that
PURPA's incentives were beginning to have an impact.43 The exemption program took effect in 1981, when FERC received 177
applications for exemptions, along with over 1800 permit applications. 4 ' The number of exemption applications almost tripled the
following year to 475 .5
This explosion of applications overwhelmed an agency that
has complained of insufficient resources almost since its inception. ' FERC attempted to cut its workload by expanding the exemption program,' 7 but a rash of resulting lawsuits hindered its
efforts.' The avalanche of applications continues today as FERC
searches for ways to alleviate its licensing burden.' 9 As the following section discloses, FERC could relieve its licensing burden simthe licensing process. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, No. 84-7325, slip op. at 15 (9th
Cir. Jan. 16, 1985).
42. O'Connor Letter, supra note 13, at 1.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
47. The chronology of events indicates that the flood of project applications
prompted FERC's efforts to expand PURPA's exemption program. FERC's initial
"natural water feature" rule, for example, denied exemptions for projects utilizing
"any structure for impounding water." 45 Fed. Reg. 76,115, 76,124 (1980). The
next year, when confronted with a 2500% single-year increase in applications,
FERC proposed a new definition of "natural water feature" which would have
allowed exemptions for projects utilizing six-foot-high dams, impounding up to
one acre-foot of water. 46 Fed. Reg. 55,536, 55,540 (1981). In 1982, FERC exemption applications tripled as the Commission finalized its new "natural water feature" rule authorizing exemptions for projects utilizing "diversion structures" up
to ten feet high, impounding less than two acre-feet of water, and not increasing
hydraulic head by more than five percent. 47 Fed. Reg. 38,506, 38,512-13 (1982).
48. In 1984, some 34 court challenges to FERC decisions were pending. See
statement of FERC Chairman Raymond J. O'Connor, Before the House Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, at 2 (Sept. 11, 1984) [hereinafter cited as O'Connor Statement] including
an Appendix of revised answers to the House Subcommittee's questions [hereinafter cited as FERC Revised Answers]; see also supra note 13.
49. FERC has even contracted outside the agency for an "independent assessment of the hydropower licensing process," focusing on "ways to improve staff
productivity and streamline the operations of the Commission." O'Connor Letter,
supra note 13, at 2.
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ply by planning for development. At the same time, plan preparation would alleviate most of the flaws inherent to FERC's system
of adjudicating hydro-license applications.

III. THE BENEFITS OF PLANNING
Comprehensive development plans could alleviate and possibly eradicate the flaws in FERC's adjudicatory system by (1)
greatly enhancing the Commission's information base for decision
making; (2) broadening FERC's focus from individual project applications to resources the Commission regulates; and (3) providing a pattern against which specific project proposals could be
judged. Together, these benefits would result in more orderly development, more efficient dedication of basin-wide resources, and
expedited FERC licensing decisions.
The FPA's comprehensive planning requirement is roughly
analogous to the master plan of land use law. Many justifications
for comprehensive planning in land use apply equally to water
power development.
A.

Lessons from Land Use Law

The land use plan serves a number of important functions,
each related to the increased information such plans provide.
Land use plans inform planners of present conditions, so that
they may set suitable goals.8 0 The planning process opens channels of communication with the public." Moreover, the comprehensive plan can "provide a pattern against which specific pro' 2
posals for use or building may be viewed. 5
The comprehensive plan can undoubtedly serve those same
purposes in water power development by providing FERC with
increased information for setting goals. At the same time, the
plan would force FERC to consider possible future conditions and
plan ahead accordingly. In addition, planning would ease the
Commission's licensing burden, by providing a pattern against
which to judge specific project proposals. Finally, truly "compre50. Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 L. &
TEMP. PROS. 353, 357-58, 360 (1955).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 360.

CON-

1986]

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT

hensive" planning would open channels of communication with
sectors of the public who currently lack a meaningful voice in
FERC's adjudicatory system.5"
B.

Criticisms of Comprehensive Planning

Despite its obvious benefits, the land use plan has been criticized on two grounds. First, it is argued that a plan cannot be
truly "comprehensive" because it is practically impossible to predict impacts on definable populations over extended periods of
time. 4 Another line of criticism doubts planners' abilities to overcome "political and organizational constraints on their operations."5 Neither criticism, however, supplies a compelling reason
not to plan. The first argument merely exhorts planners to recognize the importance of regular plan revision: once adopted, a comprehensive plan should not be cast in stone; changing circumstances and new knowledge make occasional revision imperative.5
The second criticism-that planners suffer political and organizational constraints on their abilities to plan effectively-is no more
troublesome. Planning decisions, like all choices between alternatives, inevitably are political. 7 Moreover, such constraints do not
end with the planning stage, but affect all agency decision-making
processes. In any case, Congress sought specifically to minimize
organizational constraints on FERC's planning abilities by supplying the Commission with "sufficient organization" and authority to enable it to undertake its planning responsibilities."8
Organizational constraints on the Commission were further
minimized by implicit authorization of FERC to cooperate with
other agencies in preparing comprehensive plans.5 9 Ultimately,
the fact that a comprehensive plan is not quite "comprehensive,"
53. See supra section II.A.2.
54. DiMento, Comprehensive Plan Requirements, in 1 RATHKOPF,
PLANNING § 12.05, 12-19 (4th ed. 1985).
55. Id.
56. See Haar, supra note 50, at 357-59.
57. See M.

BERNSTEIN, REGULATING

BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT

ZONING AND

COMMISSION

258 (1955) (arguing that knowledge and technical expertise alone are insufficient
to resolve regulatory decisions).
58. 1919 REPORT OF SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, H.R. REP. No. 61, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1919), reprintedin S. REP. No. 180, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1919).
59. Id.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 16:639

whether because of political constraints or scientific uncertainty,
does not detract from the important functions the plan serves in
providing information to the decision maker that broadens the
administrative focus and expedites development decision making.
Administrators should not be deprived of valuable information
simply because it is imperfect.
The continuing trend toward comprehensive plan requirements in land use law indicates a growing awareness of the value
of planning for orderly and efficient development of this country's
land resources.60 As the progressive conservationists of the early
twentieth century recognized," planning is no less valuable for
the efficient and orderly development of the nation's water resources. As a result of their efforts, Congress included a comprehensive planning requirement in the 1920 Federal Water Power
Act. The following section examines the legislative and early administrative histories of that statute, which demonstrate conclusively that Congress intended FERC and its predecessor, the
FPC, to prepare comprehensive waterway plans before issuing hydropower permits and licenses.
IV.
A.

HISTORY OF SECTION

10(a)

OF THE FEDERAL POWER ACT

The Progressive Conservationists and the Efficiency
Paradigm, 1901-1910.

Enactment of the 1920 Federal Water Power Act (FWPA)
culminated a nineteen-year struggle by progressive conservationists for federal control and development of the nation's hydroelec60. See DiMento, supra note 54, at § 21.16, 12-36. ("More and more states
have realized that without a definitive plan which will guide all land use regulation, zoning may be haphazard and amendments to the zoning map may be made
on an ad hoc basis without any reasonable relationship to the purposes of zoning."). Id. The trend towards comprehensive plan requirements in land use may
also represent a desire to get more people involved in land use decisions. Congress
has, in the last decade, enacted planning requirements for its two largest land
management agencies, the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM). See National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (1982)
(requiring land management plans for "units of the National Forest System") and
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (providing the BLM with planning responsibilities). On the Forest Service's planning obligation, see Wilkinson & Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National
Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1 (1985).
61. See infra sections IV.A. & B.
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tric resource. Disgruntled with the expensive and poorly distributed electrical service provided by the highly monopolized power
industry, the conservationists argued for "efficient" use of the nation's water power resource, under the guidance of nonpolitical
scientists and planners.6 2 This efficiency paradigm demanded basin-wide development to serve multiple purposes, including electric power generation, irrigation, and navigation." Progressives
considered federal control essential to avoid state conflicts which
might impede multiple purpose development of interstate
streams.6 4 However, many groups opposed federal control, fearing
they would be excluded from influencing resource policy-making.
Notable members of the opposition included the utilities, which
stood to lose their monopoly, and resource rich states, which
stood to lose regulatory authority over development within their
65
borders.
The Administration of Theodore Roosevelt promoted the efficiency paradigm of the progressive conservationists. 6 In his
1901 inaugural address, Roosevelt presented the conservationist
itinerary, calling for comprehensive development of the nation's
waterways by the federal government "in accordance with the ad62. See, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS COMMISSION, S. Doc.
No. 325, 60th Cong., Ist Sess. 15 (1908). For more detailed analyses of the progressive conservation movement, see S. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959); Fly, The
Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation and Utilization of Water
Resources, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 274 (1938); Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective
Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 9 (1945).
63. S. HAYS, supra note 62, at 100-01.
64. Other justifications for federal control included: State and private funding
were insufficient for large-scale projects; and only the Federal Government, which
controls navigable waters, could prevent land speculators from inhibiting development. Id. at 101-02. See also Blumm, The Northwest's Hydroelectric Heritage:
Prologue to the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act, 58 WASH. L. REV. 175, 183 nn.39-40 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hydroelectric
Heritage].
65. S. HAYS, supra note 62, at 240. Prior to federal assertion of control over
development, many states had their own water power acts. A Virginia statute, for
instance, required private developers to obtain licenses, limited license terms to
fifty years, and provided for state recapture of projects. See United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 422-23 (1940). After assertion of federal
authority, the validation of such state laws was left to FERC's discretion. See
generally First Iowa Hydro-electric Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152
(1946).
66. S.HAYS, supra note 62, at 91.
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vice of trained experts. '67 A year later, Congress passed the Reclamation Act, effectively placing the federal government in the
6
business of irrigating the arid West.
In 1906, Congress passed a General Dam Act69 which required congressional authorization for dam construction in navigable rivers, and approval of construction plans by the Secretary
of War and Chief of Engineers. Failure to comply with approved
plans resulted in divestment of construction rights.7 With the
1906 Act, Congress sought to adopt a "uniform policy with respect to an ever increasing number of applications for permits to
dam navigable streams.""
The Roosevelt Administration was dissatisfied that the 1906
Act failed to provide compensation to the government for use of
the nation's navigable waterways by private developers. The Administration was also irritated that development remained under
congressional control, subject to the influence of powerful utilities. Consequently, the President pressured Congress to amend
the law.72
In March, 1908, President Roosevelt appointed the Inland
Waterways Commission to prepare a "comprehensive plan" for
67. 35 CONG. REC. 86 (1901).
68. Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388 (1902) (codified as
amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-660e (1982)). Often referred to as the Newlands Act
after its chief sponsor, Representative Francis G. Newlands of Nevada, the Act
called for federal construction and operation of reclamation facilities. These
projects were to be self-financed through a reclamation fund, to which project
beneficiaries were to repay construction and maintenance costs in annual interestfree installments. The Act delegated authority to initiate projects, without congressional approval, to the newly created Reclamation Service, in an attempt to
take control out of the hands of politicians and place it in the hands of experts.
Blumm, Hydroelectric Heritage, supra note 64, at 183-84 n.42. For a more detailed analysis of the 1902 Reclamation Act, see G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW

105-109 (1981).

69. Pub. L. No. 262, 34 Stat. 386 (1906).
70. See H.R. REP. No. 61, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1919); see also J. KERWIN,
supra note 22, at 111-12 (1926).
71. J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 114.
72. VETO MESSAGE RELATING TO EXTENSION OF TIME FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
DAM ACROSS RAINY RIVER, S. Doc. No. 438, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1908) [hereinafter cited as VETO MESSAGE]; SPECIAL MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 1350, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1909) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL MESSAGE] (vetoing special legislation under the 1906 General Dam Act);
see infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
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development of the nation's inland waterways,7 3 marking the first
use of the "comprehensive plan" language eventually included in
the 1920 FWPA. That same year, the President created the National Conservation Commission, chaired by Gifford Pinchot,7' to
compile an extensive inventory of the nation's natural resources
and analyze their supply, rate of use, and probable date of exhaustion.7 5 In its report to Congress, the Commission recommended that a "large and comprehensive plan be adopted providing for multiple purpose waterway improvement. 7 7 The reports
of the National Conservation and Inland Waterways Commissions
reflected progressive faith in comprehensive planning for efficient
development. The reports, however, failed to induce Congress to
enact new water power legislation.
A more effective force for congressional action proved to be
President Roosevelt's veto power. In 1908 he stated his intention
not to sign any more bills permitting private dam construction
unless they provided a limited license term and payment of compensation to the government.77 Roosevelt subsequently vetoed
two bills on those grounds. In each case, the President sent a veto
message to Congress calling for reform of water power legislation
in order to protect the public from the monopolistic endeavors of

73. See Pinchot, supra note 62, at 15. Members of Roosevelt's hand-picked
Commission included Representatives Theodore E. Burton of Ohio and John H.
Bankhead of Alabama; Senators William Warner of Kansas and Francis G. Newlands of Nevada (Newlands, author of the 1902 Reclamation Act, moved from the
House to the Senate in 1903); Commissioner of Corporations Herbert Knox Smith
and W.J. McGee, a member of the Bureau of Soils. See S. HAYS, supra note 62, at
105-06.
The Inland Waterways Commission's plan was to be "designed for the benefit
of the entire country," and was to consider "all the uses to which streams may be
put." PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE INLAND WATERWAYS COMMISSION, S. Doc. No.

325, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1908).
74. The great conservationist, Pinchot, serving as Chief of the Forestry
Board, had considerable influence on Roosevelt, even before Roosevelt became
president in 1901. See S. HAYS, supra note 62, at 14.
75. Id. at 132.
76. I REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONSERVATION COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 676,
60th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1909).
77. See S. HAYS, supra note 62, at 116. Letters from President Roosevelt to
Secretary of War (Mar. 16, 1908); Roosevelt to William P. Frye (Mar. 18, 1908);
Roosevelt to Theodore E. Burton (Mar. 18, 1908). Id. at n.88, quoted in S. HAYS,
supra note 62, at 116. Roosevelt had previously approved 25 special acts under the
1906 General Dam Act. Id. at 115.
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private power companies.7 8 Roosevelt's demands made further development under the79 1906 Act impossible, thereby forcing Congress to take action.
B.

The Struggle for Effective Water Power Legislation,
1910-1920.

Congress passed the General Dam Act of 191080 as a result of
Roosevelt's efforts, despite an intervening change in Administrations."1 The new statute was a compromise measure, ultimately
leading to universal dissatisfaction. 2 Yet, the 1910 Act was significant in one respect: it was the first piece of water power legislation to require a "comprehensive plan" for improvement of the
Nation's waterways.82 Under the Act, the Secretary of War and
Chief of Engineers were to apply basin-wide comprehensive plans
in choosing suitable locations to recommend to Congress for
development."'
MESSAGE, supra note 72, at 1; SPECIAL MESSAGE, supra note 72, at 3.
79. See J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 125 (discussing legal limitations under
the 1906 Act).
80. Pub. L. No. 246, 36 Stat. 593 (1910).
81. William Howard Taft became president in March, 1909. Never a staunch
conservationist, Taft signed special acts under the 1906 General Dam Act, reversing Roosevelt Administration policy. J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 127. Nevertheless, the Roosevelt vetoes and growing sentiment favoring conservation convinced
Congress to amend the law. See H.R. REP. No. 61, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919).
82. The Act failed to please conservationists because it retained congressional
control over individual projects and did not require compensation by developers
using the nation's waterways. See J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 130. Ironically, the
Act displeased developers for some of the same reasons. Congressional control discouraged investment because it required investors to accept the risk of expensive
navigation improvements, but guaranteed no disposition of the properties after
the fifty-year license expired. Id. In the final analysis, the 1910 Act was little improvement over the 1906 Act. Id.
83. Specifically, § 1 of the 1910 Act provided:
. . . in acting upon said plans as aforesaid the Chief of Engineers and Secretary of War shall consider the bearing of said structure upon a comprehensive plan for the improvement of the waterway over which it is to be
constructed with a view to the promotion of its navigable quality and for
the full development of water power . ...
36 Stat. 594 (1910).
84. See H.R. REP. No. 1160, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1910); H.R. REP. No. 61,
66th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1919). In other respects, the bill offered little improvement
over the 1906 Act. J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 130. For instance, while the Act
did provide for government reimbursement by private developers for any expense

78. VETO
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The failure of the 1910 General Dam Act to please either developers or conservationists sent Congress back to the drawing
board. Between 1910 and 1917, Congress considered many bills to
federalize hydroelectric development, but could not agree on the
form water power legislation should take. 5 For example, in 1915,
private power interests attempted to run "gift legislation"
through Congress, while national attention focused on the war in
Europe." Their proposal, the "Shield's Bill," ' did not provide a
comprehensive planning requirement.88 Senator Newlands of Nevada89 sought to remedy the omission by offering a detailed comprehensive development scheme as an amendment to the proposed legislation. Newlands suggested dividing the country into
regions, corresponding to watersheds. A plan of development
would be mapped out for each region following scientific investigation by a commission of experts. Newlands' amendment failed,
but so too did the Shields Bill.
In 1917, Congress took a giant stride toward progressive reform of water power legislation when it created the National Waterways Commission (NWC) to prepare comprehensive plans of
development for each of the country's watersheds.91 Perhaps recognizing that the NWC's plans would be useless without some effective scheme for regulating development, President Woodrow
Wilson began to pressure Congress to undertake another attempt
at enacting water power legislation.9 2 At the same time, the President requested his Secretaries of War, Agriculture, and Interior
incurred and required developers to pay a fee sufficient to restore conditions of
navigability, 36 Stat. 593 (1910), it did not require developers to compensate the
government for the mere privilege of using the waterway. See id.
85. See J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 171-263 (analyzing a variety of proposed
water power proposals considered by Congress during the Administration of
Woodrow Wilson).
86. Id. at 198.
87. Introduced as S. 3331, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1915), the bill was named
after its chief sponsor, Senator John K. Shields of Tennessee.
88. The bill also failed to require developers to compensate the government
for the privilege of using the waterways, as conservationists demanded, and the
bill's recapture provision was ambiguous. See J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 195.
89. See supra notes 68, 73.
90. 53 CONG. REc. 3733-36 (1916); see also J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 205-06
(referring to Newlands' proposal as "broad-visioned").
91. 40 Stat. 269 (1917).
92. J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 217-18.
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to prepare a waterpower bill."
In January, 1918, the Wilson Administration introduced its
bill creating the FPC to relieve Congress of the responsibility of
overseeing water power development.9 4 The Commission, composed of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture, would
have "sufficient organization and sufficient authority to enable it
to undertake, in cooperation with other agencies, the fundamental
studies and investigations upon which such a program must be
founded if it is to be effective." 9 6 Those fundamental studies and
investigations would result in a "comprehensive plan" of develop9 6
ment, as is required by Section 10(a) of the proposed statute.
Signed into law by President Wilson on June 10, 1920,"' the
FWPA displeased many conservationists because it violated the
principles of multiple purpose development. Its focus was power
production. Navigation was a secondary consideration, while flood
control and irrigation were omitted from the Act entirely.9 8 The
Act did, however, institute a number of progressive reforms including (1) establishment of an independent commission to undertake investigations which would result in comprehensive development plans,9 9 (2) payment to the government of reasonable
charges for the privilege of using navigable waterways, 0 0 (3) a
93. Id.
94. Id. at 221.
95. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
96. THE WATER POWER BILL, H.R. REP. No. 715, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1918). The "comprehensive plan" language for that section was later altered to
"comprehensive scheme" at the request of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and
Agriculture. According to the House Report, the change was apparently made to
"clarify" the language or "improv[e] the form of the bill." Id. at 30. The reports
accompanying the 1920 Act do not indicate that the change in any way altered the
sense of the phrase as President Roosevelt employed it when he appointed the
Inland Waterways Commission in 1907. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
97. Act of June 10, 1920, ch. 285, § 30, 41 Stat. 1077, repealed by Act of Aug.
26, 1935, ch. 687, title 11, § 212, 49 Stat. 847. Congress adjourned on June 5, 1920,
having delivered the approved bill to the President on May 31. President Wilson
failed to sign the legislation before adjournment, raising the presumption that he
had applied a "pocket veto." However, Wilson's Attorney General advised him
that congressional adjournment did not deprive the President of the 10 days provided by the Constitution for consideration of a measure. See J. KERWIN, supra
note 22, at 261-63.
98. S.HAYs, supra note 62, at 239-40.
99. 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 797.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 803(e).
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10
fifty-year license term,'01 and (4) a suitable recapture provision.

2

The new FPC's planning duties eliminated the need for the
NWC, created three years earlier. 3 Thus, Congress repealed the
act creating the NWC in section 29 of the FWPA,10 4 demonstrating its intention that the new FPC take over the NWC's intensive
studies and investigations in order to produce comprehensive
plans for each of the nation's watersheds.' 0 5
C. FPC Administration of the Federal Water Power Act,
1920-1930
According to one theory of agency "life cycle," administrative
agencies lose sight of the policies which led to their creation as
time separates them from the enacting legislature.' s Still, it is
surprising that the FPC began to neglect its FWPA planning responsibilities within ten short years of the statute's enactment.
The original FPC10 7 began its administration of the FWPA
by strictly adhering to the letter of the law and the intent of Congress. In its First Annual Report to Congress (1921), the Commission interpreted its duties under section 10(a) of the Act: "if the
Commission is to comply with the requirements of the act. .. ,it
must make, or cause to be made, careful studies of the streams,
and must have a consistent scheme of development outlined,
before any permits or licenses are issued."'08 Moreover, the Commission recognized the important policies which led Congress to
101. 16 U.S.C. § 799.
102. 16 U.S.C. § 800(c).
103. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The NWC had never been
appointed.

104. 16 U.S.C. § 823.
105. The floor debates concerning § 29 of the FPA indicate that Congress
intended the new FPC to take over the planning duties of the NWC. See, e.g., 59
CONG. REc. 1173-74 (1920) (comments of Senator Ashurst regarding the duplication of planning functions between the NWC and the proposed FPC); see also B.
SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIc REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY 1874-75, 193132, 2030-31 (1973).
106. See, e.g., M. BERNSTEIN, supra note 57, at 74-75.
107. The "original" Commission, composed of the Secretaries of Interior,
War, and Agriculture, were replaced in 1930 by a full time Commission, composed
of presidential appointees. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
108. FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OP THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, H.R. Doc.
No. 242, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1921) (emphasis added).
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include the planning provision in the FWPA. In its Fourth Annual Report to Congress (1924), the FPC reiterated those policies:
If ...

we are to develop these powers to the fullest productivity,

free of all unavoidable waste, and are to secure at the same time
the correlated use of the waters for navigation, irrigation, and other
beneficial purposes, we must change from the haphazard methods
heretofore employed and proceed to prepare real plans of comprehensive stream development.' 9
In its first two years, the FPC undertook "special investigations" resulting in two comprehensive plans of development." 0 In
1921, the Commission adopted a plan, entitled "Uses of the Deschutes River in Oregon." ' The following year, the Commission
suspended all action on preliminary permit and license applications for projects on the Colorado River while it completed its
"Best Scheme of Development of the Colorado River Below Its
Junction With the Green."" 2 Thus, the Commission believed plan
adoption was prerequisite to its other regulatory activities.
While preparing plans in compliance with the FWPA, the
FPC bemoaned the lack of manpower and other resources necessary to fulfill its obligations." 3 This may partially explain the
109. FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, H. R. Doc.
No. 443, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1924) (emphasis added).
110. Every annual FPC Report between 1921 and 1928 included a section
dedicated to "special investigations" currently underway or recently completed.
See H.R. Doc. No. 242, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (1921) (reporting investigations of
the St. Lawrence and Deschutes Rivers); H.R. Doc. No. 473, 67th Cong., 3d Sess.
27-28 (1922) (reporting investigations of the Deschutes, Colorado, and Columbia
Rivers); H.R. Doc. No. 73, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1923) (reporting investigations of the Columbia, Trinity, Klamath, American, and Stanislaus Rivers); H.R.
Doc. No. 443, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1924) (reporting the completion of reports prepared by the California Power Board for the American and Trinity Rivers); H.R. Doc. No. 28, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1925) (reporting California Power
Board's completion of reports for the Trinity, American, and Stanislaus Rivers);
H.R. Doc. No. 551, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1926) (discussing investigations of the
Trinity and Stanislaus Rivers in California); H.R. Doc. No. 28, 70th Cong., 1st
Sess. 34 (1927) (reporting new investigations of the Klamath, Pit, New, and Savannah Rivers); H.R. Doc. No. 381, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1928) (repeating report from 1927 Annual Report).
111. The Commission's First Annual Report contains a summary of that comprehensive plan. See supra note 108, at 30-33.
112. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, H.R. Doc.
No. 473, 67th Cong. 3d Sess. 27-28, 177-200 (1922).
113. See supra note 108, at 33 and note 109, at 9.
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Commission's otherwise mysterious cessation of comprehensive
planning activities in the late 1920's."" Later, the FPC adopted a
new interpretation of section 10(a), which effectively transformed
its planning obligation into a directive to license projects in the
"public interest," a standard FERC maintains today.1" 5
D.

Amendment of the Federal Water Power Act,
1930 and 1935.

Throughout the 1920's, conservationists questioned the capacity of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture, who
were constrained by other duties, to administer adequately water
power development.'" Consequently, Congress replaced the cabinet members in 1930 with an independent, full-time FPC com1 7
posed of five presidential appointees.
114. In 1929, for the first time, the Annual FPC Report contained no section
dedicated to "special investigations." H.R. Doc. No. 211, 71st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1929). Contrast supra note 110. After 1929, the Commission occasionally paid lip
service to its planning obligations, but any investigations undertaken invariably
promoted existing project proposals. No further comprehensive plans were prepared. See, e.g., FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, LETTER FROM THE
CHAIRMAN

OF THE FEDERAL

POWER COMMISSION TRANSMITTING

IN RESPONSE TO

SENATE RESOLUTION No. 351, SEVENTY-SECOND CONGRESS, A REPORT OF ALL FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION AND THE ANNUAL COST THEREOF, S. Doc.

No. 18, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1933); THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION, H.R. Doc. No. 19, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1950).
115. See, e.g., Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency, 25 FERC T 61,052,
61,176 (1983); Southern California Edison Co., 8 FPC 364, 386 (1949) ("The Commission has not read Section 10(a) of the Federal Power Act as requiring that a
single 'comprehensive plan' be prepared against which a proposed project is measured before a license is issued. Rather, a proposed project is measured against the
aggregate of information on beneficial public uses of the waterway developed in
the record in the proceeding."); O'Connor Letter, supra note 13, at 39.
116. Pinchot, supra note 62, at 19-20. The conservationists' criticism of the
cabinet members was somewhat harsh, considering their strict adherence to the
most progressive aspects of the FWPA. The Commission undertook numerous
river investigations and prepared two comprehensive plan documents during the
tenure of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. See supra notes 107-12
and accompanying text.
117. Ch. 572, 46 Stat. 797 (1930), (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 792,
793, 797 (1982)). See also COMM. ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE, TO REORGANIZE THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, S. REP. No. 378, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1930) (citing
to the unmanageable workload of the cabinet members as the reason Congress
reorganized the FPC). Ironically, the new, full-time FPC never found the time to
undertake intensive river investigations, and never prepared a single comprehen-
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The 1935 Federal Power Act (FPA)"' subsumed its 1920
predecessor with few, and mostly "minor," amendments." s One
significant amendment expanded the beneficial uses to which licensed projects might be adapted under section 10(a) of the Act,
expressly providing that the Commission may consider recreational purposes. 2 ' The principle focus of the 1935 Act, entitled
the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 2 ' federalized ratemaking for wholesale and interstate sales of electricity, thus making
the 1935 FPA, a product of the New Deal, a more complete embodiment of progressive conservationist policies.' 22
But, unfortunately, the Act never fulfilled conservationist's
hopes of an efficient and orderly system of basin-wide, multiple
purpose waterway development. After the first few years of its administration,' 22 the FPC, and then FERC, refused to undertake
the regional studies and investigations necessary to produce the
comprehensive plans considered prerequisite to efficient waterway
development by the progressive conservationists. In his 1926 history of water power legislation, 24 Jerome Kerwin suggested that
Congress' failure to adopt Senator Newlands' "broad-visioned"
sive plan. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
118. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-823.
119. PUBLIC UTILITY ACT OF 1935, H.R. REP. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1935). One "minor" change concerned § 10(a), where Congress substituted the
word "plan" for the word "scheme." No reason was given for this re-substitution
(see supra note 96); in fact, Senate and House reports on the legislation failed to
note the change. See id. at 24; PUBLIC UTILITY ACT OF 1935, S. REP. No. 621, 74th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1935). The Senate Report actually maintained the word
"scheme." Id.
120. H.R. REP. No. 1318, supra note 119, at 24. This vindicated conservationists critical of the 1920 Act's failure to provide true multiple purpose development. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. On the importance of the recreational purposes addition, see Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 436438 (1967) (discussing the purpose of the addition of "recreational purposes" to
the FPC's "best adapted" criteria, under § 10(a) of the FPA); Namekagon Hydro
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 216 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1954) (sustaining an
FPC order denying issuance of license under the FPA because of unique recreational features of the proposed dam site).
121. Ch. 687, 49 Stat. 851 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 81213).
122. Cf. Fly, supra note 62, at 293 ("For it remained to President Franklin D.
Roosevelt to give the fullest expression to the principles of the conservationists.").
123. See supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 22.

1986]

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT

comprehensive plan proposal in 1916,"' produced the "hit-ormiss system of dredging a little here and digging a little there
that has characterized our water-development system" ever
since.' 6 Actually, Congress did adopt the essence, if not the detail
of Newlands' proposal in section 10(a) of the 1920 FWPA, which
does require preparation of comprehensive plans for development.1 27 Nevertheless, Congress remains responsible for the existing haphazard system of water power development due to its
acquiescence to the historically unsupported interpretation of section 10(a) adopted by the FPC after 1930 and maintained by
FERC today.
Growing pressure on Congress to reinforce the FPA's planning directive has forced some recent movement on Capitol
Hill.'28 But Congress is not the only entity capable of forcing
FERC to plan for development. Because a comprehensive plan requirement already exists in FERC's statutory mandate, a court
may order the Commission to plan. In fact, the issue is currently
before the Ninth Circuit United States Court of Appeals.' 29 The
following section analyzes congressional and judicial efforts to revive the FPA's planning requirement.
V.

JUDICIAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROSPECTS FOR RESURRECTING THE

FEDERAL POWER ACT'S COMPREHENSIVE PLAN REQUIREMENT
Recent widespread criticism of the FPA's regulatory system
and its administration by FERC has reawakened congressional interest in federal hydropower regulation. 8 0 Congress is currently
considering several legislative proposals to alter FERC's mandate, 18 1 which suggest various regulatory reforms including (1)
125. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
126. J. KERWIN, supra note 22, at 205-6.
127. See 16 U.S.C. § 803(a), which, like Newlands' 1916 proposal, ostensibly
requires consideration of basin-wide comprehensive plans in FERC licensing
decisions.
128. See infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also infra section V.B.
129. See infra notes 134 & 137 and accompanying text; see also infra section

V.A.
130. See, e.g., Colbo Statement, supra note 21.
131. These include S.426, sponsored by Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop
(see inira notes 162-68 and accompanying text), S. 870, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,
CONG. REC. 54020 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985), sponsored by Senator Mitchell of
Maine, and a March 15, 1985 draft proposal by Washington Congressman Al
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mandating cumulative impacts analyses of FERC-licensed
projects, 3 ' and (2) eliminating the incentives provided by
PURPA, the ESA, and the Windfall Profits Tax Act.' 33 Both of
these suggestions offer the hope of more rational resource
management.
Another potential solution to FERC's inefficient resource
management already exists in the Commission's statutory mandate: the comprehensive plan requirement of section 10(a) of the
FPA. ' 34 Like some of the other proposed solutions, a comprehensive plan requirement would (1) increase FERC's information
base, resulting in a more orderly development and a more efficient dedication of basin-wide resources, 135 and (2) shift FERC's
focus from the technical aspects and power potential of individual
projects to the resources those projects impact. 13 6 In addition, the
comprehensive planning solution has certain advantages over
other proposed reforms: a comprehensive plan requirement would
(1) not require congressional action. 37 (2) obviate the need for
later cumulative impacts analyses, 3 8 and (3) expedite FERC licensing procedures by providing a pattern against which to judge
specific development proposals. 139
Swift, which has yet to be introduced in Congress.
132. See, e.g., § 4, Congressman Swift's draft bill, supra note 131. On FERC
and the cumulative impacts analysis generally, see Eckberg, supra note 24.
133. See, e.g., § 10, Congressman Swift's draft bill, supra note 131. Critics
have suggested this reform, in favor of allowing market forces to select sites for
hydroelectric projects. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 38, at 49 ("At the very least,
the value of such projects, as well as all projects opposed by pertinent federal and
state agencies, ought to be determined by market forces unencumbered by
subsidies.").
134. 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982).
135. See supra discussion in section III.A and text accompanying note 50.
Cumulative impacts analyses would similarly increase FERC's information base.
See Eckberg, supra note 24, at 10 ("the documentation resulting from the basinwide approach could fulfill or supplement FERC's 'comprehensive plan' obligations under the Federal Power Act").
136. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
137. Because the planning requirement is already part of FERC's statutory
marching orders, a court may order compliance. In fact, the National Wildlife
Federation is currently seeking such an order from the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court
of Appeals in National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC. See infra Sec. V.A.
138. A truly "comprehensive" plan would assess the cumulative impacts of
projected development. The Commission would therefore be relieved of the burden of performing such an analysis during licensing proceedings.
139. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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The FPA's comprehensive plan requirement is currently at
issue before Congress and before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 4" However, a judicial resurrection of the FPA's section
10(a) may not suffice to reform FERC's regulatory system; for although the court can require the Commission to plan, it probably
cannot dictate how or how much to plan.'
A.

Judicial Prospects: The Salmon Basin Case

In 1984, the National Wildlife Federation petitioned the
Ninth Circuit to review a spate of FERC orders, charging that the
Commission's refusal to prepare comprehensive plans of development before permitting and licensing projects is unlawful, under
section 10(a) of the FPA.' 42 This suit marks the first challenge to
the Commission's interpretation of that provision since the FPC
adopted its "public interest standard" position more than half a
4
century earlier.' 1
Faced with almost fifty project applications for the Salmon
River Basin in Idaho,' 44 FERC steadfastly refused to adopt a
140. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
141. See infra note 156 and accompanying text.
142. No. 84-7325 (9th Cir. May 14, 1984); Brief for National Wildlife Federation and Idaho Wildlife Federation, National Wildlife Federation v. FERC, No.
84-7325 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 1985) [hereinafter cited as NWF's Brief].
143. But cf. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm'n, 345
U.S. 153 (1953) (requiring Commission licensing decisions to be "best adapted" to
congressionally approved comprehensive plans). The fifty year delay between the
beginning of the FPC's misinterpretation and the first resulting court challenge
should not be surprising. In 1930-about the time the FPC began neglecting its
planning obligations-the effects of hydropower development on such resources as
anadromous fish populations and habitat were largely unknown. See, e.g., REPORT
OF THE COMMISSIONER OF FISHERIES ON BONNEVILLE DAM AND PROTECTION OF THE

S. Doc. No. 87, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1937) ("The
conservation of a great fishery resource involves a variety of circumstances, concerning which there is a dearth of information at the present time."). Moreover,
there were no public interest groups, such as the Sierra Club and National Wildlife Federation, with the inclination and resources to fight for aesthetic and recreational resource benefits. In fact, judicial standing requirements before 1972 would
have precluded such groups from pressing their concerns. (In 1972, the Supreme
Court decided Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), ruling that where Congress has granted standing-as in the FPA-noneconomic injuries could be adequate to obtain access to the courts.)
COLUMBIA RIVER FISHERIES,

144. The exact number was 48. See NWF's Brief, supra note 142, at 22.
The Salmon River flows from the mountains of Custer County, Idaho, some

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 16:639

comprehensive plan of development prior to issuing preliminary
permits.'"" The National Wildlife Federation (NWF) intervened
in the Commission's proceedings arguing that, without the guidance of a pre-existing plan as required by section 10(a) of the
FPA, FERC could not reasonably determine which, if any of the
projects were needed and at what locations.'" FERC declined to
accept the NWF's invitation to plan, and also refused to prepare
a cumulative impacts analysis prior to issuing permits from
among the four dozen applications for the Salmon Basin.'4 The
NWF appealed the subsequent issuance of five of those four
dozen permits to the Ninth Circuit.'""

Before the court, the NWF argued that the legislative and
early administrative histories of the FPA indicated that Congress
intended section 10(a) to compel FERC to prepare comprehensive
river basin plans prior to permitting or licensing projects." 9 Specifically, the NWF relied on much of the same legislative history

analyzed in section IV of this Article, and on the 1921 First Annual Report of the FPC, in which the Commission interpreted
section 10(a) to require preparation of comprehensive plans
"before any permits or licenses are issued."' 50 In response, FERC
argued that section 10(a)'s requirements apply only to license, not
to permit, applications.' 5' Moreover, the Commission denied the
420 miles to its confluence with the Snake River at the Washington border. The
entire Salmon River basin covers 14,000 square miles. See Brief for FERC at 5,
National Wildlife Fed'n v. FERC, No. 84-7325 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1985) [hereinafter
cited as FERC's Brief]. The Salmon River constitutes "some of the best anadromous fish spawning habitat remaining in the Northwest." Blumm, Restoring Columbia Basin Salmon under the Northwest Power Act: A Report on the Experiment and a Look at Some Storm Clouds on the Horizon [1979-Present Transfer
Binder], 30 ANADROMOUS FISH L. MEMO (NAT. RESOURCES L. INST.) 11 (June 1985).
145. See FERC's Brief, supra note 144, at 9.
146. NWF's Brief, supra note 142, at 21.
147. FERC performed a limited cumulative impacts analysis, which applied
only to license applications. FERC argues that preparing cumulative impacts analyses at the permitting stage would be premature, considering the number of permitted projects that never receive a license. FERC's Brief, supra note 144, at 9.
On the distinction between license and permit applications, see supra note 11.
148. Id. at 3. All appeals of FERC orders must be made in the federal circuit
courts of appeal. 16 U.S.C. § 825(b).
149. NWF's Brief, supra note 142, at 17-18, 19-20.
150. Id. at 20; see also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
151. FERC's Brief, supra note 144, at 15-16. On the distinction between license and permit applications, see supra note 11.
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admissibility of the FPA's early administrative history because
the NWF did not raise the issue at FERC's rehearing. 2 In any
case, FERC argued, the NWF mistook the original FPC's intent:
According to FERC, the Commission was "at most . . .expressing a view as to the scope of its discretion in extending the requirement to permits,"' 3 and its opinion should not bind the
Commission today. 54
A Ninth Circuit decision on the comprehensive planning issue in the Salmon Basin Case could have significant consequences
for FERC's regulatory system and the resources it affects. 5' However, even if the court orders FERC to plan before issuing permits, it will likely leave the nature of the plan entirely to agency
discretion because the FPA contains no provision detailing the
planning procedures the agency must follow.' 6 It is therefore conceivable that a NWF victory in the Salmon Basin Case might not
result in more efficient resource management. A planning mandate will only promote efficient development if the responsible
agency diligently plans for efficiency. The result of planning depends entirely on the goals of the planner.
Unlike the court in National Wildlife Federation v. FERC,
Congress can establish specific planning procedures and goals,
152. FERC's Brief, supra note 144, at 16.
153. Id. at 17.
154. FERC admitted that the Commission's original interpretation of the
statute would be binding unless the agency offered a "rational explanation" for a
change in policy. Id. However, the Commission failed to cite any contemporaneous
"rational explanation" for the FPC's abandonment of its original interpretation of
Sec. 10(a).
155. The court may well avoid deciding the planning issue, if it can decide
the case on one of the other issues where there is more precedent to apply. The
other issues in the case concern cumulative impacts analyses under the National
Environmental Policy Act and obligations imposed on FERC by the Northwest
Power Act. See NWF's Brief, supra note 142, at 32-49.
156. Note, however, that other courts have specified what FERC's Sec. 10(a)
"best adapted" determination must entail, under FERC's public interest standard.
See, e.g., Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967) (" ... including future power demand and supply, alternate sources of power, the public interest in preserving reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas, the preservation of
anadromous fish for commercial and recreational purposes, and the protection of
wildlife"). Presumably, the Ninth Circuit could specify the minimal criteria a plan
must satisfy to be considered "comprehensive" under Sec. 10(a) of the FPA. It is
more likely, however, that the court would leave specifics to FERC discretion and
await another lawsuit challenging the resulting plan's comprehensiveness.
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which FERC must follow, improving the chances for good plans
which promote efficient resource use. Fortunately, prospects are
promising for congressional resurrection of the FPA's planning
157
requirement.
B. Legislative Prospects
Congress has recently considered several legislative proposals
to reinforce section 10(a) of the FPA. 5 8 These proposals share the
common goal of resurrecting the dormant comprehensive plan
clause, by forcing FERC to either prepare its own development
plans or, at least, seriously consider the plans prepared by state,
regional, or other federal authorities.159 The proposals typically
provide that FERC-adopted plans would be effective for five
years, after which they would be subject to review.1s0 In addition,
each proposal would extend the purposes for which hydroprojects
might be "best adapted," expressly including fish and wildlife
protection as a beneficial use.1"'
On October 2, 1985, the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources reported favorably on one of the legislative
proposals to amend the FPA, the Electric Consumers Protection
16 2
Act of 1985, sponsored by Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop.
Among other things,"' that bill would direct FERC (1) to consider the extent to which proposed projects are consistent with
157. See infra section V.B.
158. See supra note 131.
159. See, e.g., S. 426, § 3(c)(2)(A), reprintedin S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1985) (85 C.I.S. S313-12) (requiring FERC to "consider" comprehensive plans prepared by state, regional, and other federal authorities); S. 870, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess., CONG. REc. 54020 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985) (allowing states to prepare development plans for FERC review and "approval"); and Congressman Al
Swift's draft bill (Mar. 15, 1985), §§ 6, 9 (requiring FERC to adopt state or regionally prepared plans which meet certain minimal standards).
160. See, e.g., S. 870, 99th Cong., 1st Seas. § 3(a)(3), 131 CONG. REC. at 402122; § 9, Congressman Swift's draft bill, supra note 131, at 8-19.
161. See, e.g., S. 426, § 3(a), S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1985)
(85 C.I.S. S313-12).
162. S. 426, reprinted in S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., at 6-7 (1985)
(85 C.I.S. S313-12).
163. One major feature of the bill, not related to comprehensive planning, is
its provision which would eliminate the FPA's municipal preference from FERC
relicensing proceedings, in favor of a preference for original licensees. S. 426, § 4,
supra note 162, at 2.
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the comprehensive plans of appropriate agencies, including the
Northwest Power Planning Council and the states affected by the
proposed project;"6 4 and (2) provide written explanations to interested federal and state agencies as to why the Commission rejected or modified their recommendations for terms and conditions on licenses' 6 5
Unfortunately, S. 426 would not require FERC to adhere to
any comprehensive plan. In fact, the bill would not impose any
new planning obligations on the Commission.' The directive in
S. 426-that FERC consider the extent to which a project is consistent with plans prepared by entities such as the Northwest
Power Planning Council-merely restates Congress' Northwest
Power Act requirement directing FERC to consider the Council's
comprehensive plan at each relevant stage of its decision-making
process."6 7 As a result, S. 426 is less effective than other recent
legislative proposals attempting to resurrect the FPA's dormant
planning requirement. 6 However, the House of Representatives,
on January 21, 1986, passed related legislation, which includes a
somewhat more forceful planning provision. 69
S. 426 and other current legislative proposals to amend the
FPA represent long overdue congressional concern that FERC's
administration of a regulatory system largely unamended for
more than fifty years no longer reflects the public interest. For
the past year, Congress has been gathering information and scrutinizing various legislative proposals which would update that
regulatory system, bringing it into line with contemporary notions
164. S. 426, § 3(c)(2)(A), supra note 162, at 1-2.
165. S. 426, § 3(c)(3)(A), supra note 162, at 2.
166. S. REP. No. 161, supra note 162, at 9. ("This provision does not place any
additional requirement on the FERC to adopt or to reject any particular recommendation. It only requires the FERC to state the reasons for its decision.")
167. See supra note 21.
168. Specifically, it is far less effective than the draft proposal of Washington
Congressman Al Swift, which would require FERC to adopt plans submitted by
state, regional, and other federal entities, which meet certain minimal standards.
169. H. R. 44, discussed in S. REP. No. 161, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 7 (1985)
(85 C.I.S. S313-12). Specifically, the bill requires FERC to give fish and wildlife
"equitable treatment" in its "best adapted" analysis under § 10(a). The bill also
provides for greater input by the Northwest Power Planning Council in FERC
licensing decisions, but does not require the Commission to prepare or adopt any
comprehensive plans.
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of conservation and cooperative federalism.1 70 However, it is not
possible to predict if or when Congress will enact new water
power legislation. Nevertheless, by focusing public attention on
FERC's administrative record, the recent congressional interest
itself constitutes a small victory for more efficient resource
management.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Whether judicially or congressionally mandated, comprehensive plans offer the best hope of improving the federal government's system of regulating hydropower development. Planning
for development would alleviate flaws in FERC procedures, which
today focus on individual project applications. Basin-wide comprehensive plans would encourage more efficient dedication of basin-wide resources by enlarging the Commission's focus to include
those resources. 171 In addition, comprehensive plans would expedite FERC licensing decisions and promote orderly development
of resources by substantially increasing FERC's information
72
base.

1

The progressive conservationists of the early twentieth century recognized the importance of planning for orderly development and efficient resource management. 7 3 They persuaded Congress to place a comprehensive planning requirement at the
"heart" of the 1920 FWPA.174 However, after less than a decade
of strict adherence to that directive, the FPC began to neglect its
planning obligations, arguing that section 10(a) merely established a "public interest" standard for its licensing decisions." 5
The FERC maintains that position today.176
170. See remarks of Senator Mitchell of Maine, introducing legislation to
amend § 10(a) of the FPA, 131 CONG. REc. S4020 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1985) ("I am
introducing legislation which will enable States and the Federal Government to
work together in promoting the effective utilization and sound management of
river resources.").
171. See supra note 23-24, 136 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 50-52, 135 and accompanying text.
173, See supra section IV.A.
174. See supra section IV; see also O'Connor Statement, supra note 48, at 7
(referring to § 10(a) as "the heart of the licensing provisions of the Federal Power
Act").
175. See supra notes 107-115 and accompanying text.

176. Id.
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After sixty years of acquiescing to the Commissions' interpretation of section 10(a), Congress is now considering a number of
proposals to resurrect the planning requirement. 177 This renewed
interest is the result of recent criticism citing to flaws in the
FPA's hydro-licensing system,'17 8 flaws revealed during the first
half-decade of the 1980's, when would-be developers, seeking to
take advantage of recently enacted federal subsidies,7 9 buried
FERC under an avalanche of applications for small hydroprojects. s
Congress is not the only entity capable of compelling FERC
to plan. Because the comprehensive plan requirement already exists in FERC's statutory mandate,'
a court may order compliance. In fact, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is currently
scrutinizing the Commission's interpretation of section 10(a). s8 If
nothing else, this recent combination of judicial and congressional
attention has focused public attention on FERC's management of
the nation's rivers, encouraging the commission to adopt a more
responsible posture.
To be effective, a congressional or judicial order to plan must
be goal-oriented.' 8 ' Without policy objectives, planning makes no
sense. FERC should plan to achieve the original conservationist
goals of orderly river basin development and efficient basin-wide
resource use. As the history of water power legislation indicates, 84 those are the goals Congress implicitly mandated in section 10(a) of the FPA. Under a paradigm of efficiency, comprehensive planning would promote informed and expedited
resource-oriented decision making.
177. See supra note 131. This renewed interest in water resource planning
comes nearly a decade after Congress implemented planning requirements for its
chief land manager, the Forest Service, and the Bureau of Land Management. See
supra note 60.
178. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
179. On these subsidies, see section II. B.1.
180. See supra section II.B.2.
181. Sec. 10(a), 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1982).
182. See supra section V.A.
183. For this reason, a congressional order to plan may be preferable to courtordered planning. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. However, the conservationist goals of efficiency are implicit in § 10(a) of the FPA. See supra section IV. A particularly active court may implement those implicit goals in an order
directing FERC to plan in accordance with § 10(a).
184. See supra section IV.

